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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL-PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1100-Commonwealth's failure to monitor
court dates constitutes failure of due diligence.
Commonwealth v Browne, 526 Pa 83, 584 A2d 902 (1990).
In a criminal complaint dated April 5 and filed with the District
Justice April 6, 1987, Edward Browne, Jr. was charged with driving
under the influence of alcohol and two companion summary of-
fenses.1 The complaint and summons were mailed to Browne on
April 21, 1987.2 The initial date set by the District Justice for a
preliminary hearing was June 17; however, the hearing was actu-
ally held on July 1, 1987, pursuant to a continuance requested by
the defendant.3 Finding that a prima facie case of driving under
the influence of alcohol existed, the District Justice ordered the
case held over for trial by the Court of Common Pleas, and had the
defendant served with a "Notice of Arraignment"4 dated July 1.5
The notice scheduled the defendant for arraignment on September
30, 1987.6 Although the District Justice actually assigned the ar-
raignment date, it is significant to note that the ultimate responsi-
bility to conduct arraignments rested with the District Attorney,
pursuant to Lancaster County's Local Rule of Criminal Procedure
Number 303.7 A transcript of the preliminary hearing was received
1. Commonwealth v Browne, 526 Pa 83, 584 A2d 902, 903 (1990). The charges were
brought under the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann. Id. The two summary offenses in-
volved were "driving on the right side of a roadway," 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3301 (Purdon
1977), and "period for required lighted lamp," 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 4302 (Purdon 1977).
Brief for Appellee at 1, Commonwealth v Browne, (Pa Super 1987) (No 3516).
2. Browne, 584 A2d at 903.
3. Id. The issue in Browne centered on the Commonwealth's failure to bring the
defendant to trial within the 180 day period mandated by the then-in-effect PaRCrP 1100.
The date the complaint was filed was significant in that it marked the starting point for
calculating the 180 day period. Id.
4. A "Notice of Arraignment" is prepared by the District Justice at the conclusion
of the preliminary hearing for cases being held for trial in Lancaster County. The defendant
is served with the notice, which specifies the scheduled date of the defendant's arraignment.
Brief for Appellee at 2, Commonwealth v Browne, (Pa 1990) (No 4).
5. Browne, 584 A2d at 903.
6. Id at 904. The case was held for trial by the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to
PaRCrP 143. Id.
7. Id at 904 n.1. The local rule states, in pertinent part:
A. Arraignment shall be conducted by the District Attorney or his court approved
designee, who shall be called the Arraignment Officer. Arraignment shall consist of
calling the accused before the Arraignment Officer, identifying him, advising him of
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by the Clerk of Courts for Lancaster County on July 8, 1987, and a
copy of the "Notice of Arraignment" was received by the District
Attorney's office at approximately the same time." The assigned ar-
raignment date of September 30, 1987 corresponded to the Novem-
ber, 1987 term of the Court of Common Pleas in Lancaster
County.9 The system in use in the county assigned a given case to
the court term corresponding to the date of arraignment. 10 The ef-
fect, therefore, of the District Justice's assignment of the Septem-
ber 30th arraignment date was that the defendant could be
brought to trial no earlier than November 9, 1987 (the first day of
the November, 1987 term of court)."
Rule 1100(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure (hereinafter "Rule 1100(a)(2)"), which was in effect at all
times relevant to this case, required that a criminal trial be com-
menced within 180 days of the filing of the written complaint that
initiated the action. 2 The November 9, 1987 trial date was subse-
quent to the expiration of the 180 day maximum period allowed
under Rule 1100.13
The Commonwealth filed an information 4 against Browne on
the charges in the information, furnishing him a copy of the information, and advis-
ing him of his right to counsel and of the time periods within which he may com-
mence discovery, file an omnibus pretrial motion and request a bill of particulars.
Id, citing Lancaster County Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 303.
8. Browne, 584 A2d at 903. The exact date the District Attorney's office received the
"Notice of Arraignment" is uncertain. Id. However, the trial court's opinion indicates that
the notice was received around July 8, 1987. Commonwealth v Browne, No 1331, slip op at 2
(Pa Coin P1, Lancaster Cty, March 14, 1988).
9. Browne, 584 A2d at 904. The judicial district of Lancaster County has a term
system of criminal trials, consisting of six two-week terms of court annually. Each term has
a corresponding date of "arraignment court." Id.
10. Id. The trial court's Memorandum Opinion noted that there was a two-week term
of court, commencing on September 8, 1987, followed by a two-week term commencing No-
vember 9, 1987. The "arraignment court" dates identified on the court's published calendar
which corresponded to these terms were July 29 and September 30, 1987, respectively. Id.
11. Id at 905.
12. Id at 903. Rule 1100(a)(2), which was in effect at all times relevant to this case
(repealed December 31, 1987), stated: "Trial in a court case in which a written criminal
complaint is fied against the defendant after June 30, 1974 shall commence no later than
one hundred eighty (180) days from the date on which the complaint is filed." PaRCrP
1100(a)(2). Accounting for the fourteen day delay attributable to the defendant (the contin-
uance to July 1, from the original June 17, 1987 preliminary hearing date), the 180 day
period lapsed on October 18, 1987. Browne, 584 A2d at 905.
13. Browne, 584 A2d at 905.
14. An information is similar to an indictment except that the former is issued by a
public official, while the latter is issued by a grand jury. Black's Law Dictionary 701 (West,
5th ed 1979).
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August 5, 1987.'15 The Commonwealth then timely filed a Petition
for Extension of Time for Commencing Trial."6 On November 2,
the trial court denied the petition, and on November 23, 1987, the
defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 1100.17 The
court granted the motion and dismissed the charges on November
23, 1987.18 The trial judge found that the Commonwealth was not
entitled to an extension of time to commence trial absent a satis-
factory reason for the delay that would demonstrate the exercise of
due diligence on the part of the District Attorney. 9
The Commonwealth appealed to the superior court, which re-
versed the trial court and held that the Commonwealth had satis-
fied the standard of due diligence and was not responsible for the
delay. 20 The intermediate appellate court relied primarily on Com-
monwealth v Monosky,2' which held that the Commonwealth was
generally not responsible for delays occasioned by other "agencies"
within the criminal justice system.2 The superior court concluded
that it was the District Justice's scheduling of the arraignment, not
the District Attorney, that precipitated the delay.23 The superior
court concluded it would not hold the Commonwealth responsible
15. Browne, 584 A2d at 905.
16. Id. The Commonwealth's petition averred that the cause of the delay was the
scheduling of the arraignment for September 30, 1987. Browne, No 1331 of 1987, slip op at 4
(Pa Corn P1, Lancaster Cty, March 14, 1988).
17. Browne, 584 A2d at 905.
18. Id. In his Memorandum Opinion, Judge Perezous distinguished the instant case
from Commonwealth v Monosky, 511 Pa 148, 511 A2d 1346 (1986). Judge Perezous reasoned
that, unlike the situation in Monosky, the District Attorney had received notice of the Dis-
trict Justice's actions in ample time to correct the Rule 1100 problem presented. The trial
court concluded that the District Attorney should have been prepared to bring the case to
trial during the September term of the Criminal Court, and failure to do so was a lack of
due diligence. Browne, No 1331, slip op at 3, 4 (Pa Corn P1, Lancaster Cty, March 14, 1988).
19. Browne, No 1331, slip op at 4 (Pa Corn P1, Lancaster Cty, March 14, 1988).
20. Browne, 584 A2d at 905.
21. 511 Pa 148, 511 A2d 1346 (1986).
22. Browne, 584 A2d at 905. Judges Cavanaugh and Brosky were in the majority,
with Judge Montemuro dissenting. Browne, No 03516, slip op at 1, 8 (Pa Super 1987). The
Supreme Court's opinion indicated that the superior court had relied on Monosky in reach-
ing their conclusion. Browne, 584 A2d at 905. However, the superior court had noted that
Monosky differed from the instant case in that here the Commonwealth was made aware of
the charges and the arraignment date in ample time to take action to avoid a Rule 1100
problem. Browne, No 03516, slip op at 4 (Pa Super 1987). The superior court then stated
that they found no precedent directly on point. Their analysis cited several cases involving
other agencies within the system, and concluded that Commonwealth v Lamb, 309 Pa Super
415, 455 A2d 678 (1983), was most closely analogous. Browne, No 03516, slip op at 6 (Pa
Super 1987). See also Commonwealth v Harris, 315 Pa Super 544, 462 A2d 725 (1983); Com-
monwealth v Lewis, 287 Pa Super 64, 429 A2d 721 (1981).
23. Browne, 584 A2d at 905.
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for failing to oversee the actions of the District Justice, just as the
court had not historically "held the Commonwealth responsible for
derelictions on the part of other agencies within the system.
'24
Browne's appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
founded upon the issue of whether the Commonwealth had acted
with due diligence when the District Attorney failed to monitor the
assignment of arraignment dates to ensure that the mandate of
Rule 1100(a)(2) was met.26
The supreme court26 reversed the superior court, concluding that
the District Attorney, who was ultimately responsible for schedul-
ing arraignments, had not met the test of due diligence.27 The
court reasoned that to expect the District Attorney's office to en-
sure compliance with Rule 1100 by maintaining a simple diary
monitoring court dates was not unreasonably burdensome, and
that failure to do so was a failure to exercise due diligence.2 s The
court concluded that it was the District Attorney's failure to moni-
tor the docket, not the District Justice's assignment of arraignment
dates, that ultimately was responsible for the delay.29 Conse-
quently, the trial court's decision dismissing the charges against
Browne with prejudice was reinstated.30
In his concurring opinion, Justice Zappala cited a number of in-
24. Browne, No 03516, slip op at 8 (Pa Super 1987).
25. Browne, 584 A2d at 905. PaRCrP 1100(c)(3) allowed the Commonwealth to mo-
tion for an extension of time to commence trial so long as the Commonwealth had exercised
due diligence. Subsection (c)(3) of the rule required that:
Such motion shall set forth facts in support thereof, and shall be granted only upon
findings based upon a record showing that trial can not be commenced within the
prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth and, if the delay is due
to the court's inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, upon find-
ings based upon a record showing the causes of delay, and the reasons why the delay
cannot be avoided.
PaRCrP 1100(c)(3).
26. The four member majority consisted of Chief Justice Nix and Justices Flaherty,
Zappala and Papadakos. Justices Larsen and Cappy dissented. Justice McDermott did not
participate in the consideration of this case. Browne, 584 A2d at 903, 906.
27. Id at 906. The court cited Commonwealth v Smith, 477 Pa 424, 383 A2d 1280,
1282 (1978), and Commonwealth v Polsky, 493 Pa 402, 426 A2d 610 (1981), in support of
their view that the due diligence requirement required the prosecution to do everything
reasonably within their power to bring the case to trial in a timely manner. Browne, 584 A2d
at 905.
28. Browne, 584 A2d at 906. The court thus rejected the Commonwealth's contention
that to require the District Attorney to monitor the district justices to insure proper sched-
uling exceeded the requirements of "reasonable effort" enunciated in Polsky, 426 A2d 610
(1981). Brief for Appellee at 6, 12, Commonwealth v Browne, 584 A2d 902 (Pa 1990) (No 4).




stances in which the court allowed cases to go to trial under excep-
tions to Rule 1100, and in which he had filed dissenting opinions.31
Justice Zappala opined that the rule had been viewed as impotent
prior to the Browne decision and accordingly went on to applaud
the majority decision, which he hailed as revitalizing the rule.3 2 In
his opinion, the exceptions had swallowed the rule and its rebirth
was necessary."
Justice Larsen's one sentence dissenting opinion stated that he
would have affirmed the superior court on the basis of its Memo-
randum Opinion.3 4 Justice Cappy dissented without comment.
35
The concept of the right to a speedy trial predates the Magna
Carta,"6 and is incorporated into the United States Constitution by
the Sixth Amendment. 7 The United States Supreme Court has
ruled that the constitutional right to a speedy trial is "fundamen-
tal"3" and is enforceable against the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9
While recognizing a clear right to a speedy trial, the Supreme
Court did not attempt to articulate the criteria by which that right
was to be measured until its opinion in Barker v Wingo.4" The
Court in Barker specifically refused to quantify a specific period of
time within which a defendant must be brought to trial before
finding that the right to a speedy trial had been denied.4' The
31. Id. See Commonwealth v Bond, 516 Pa 171, 532 A2d 339 (1987) (Zappala dissent-
ing); Commonwealth v Koonce, 511 Pa 452, 515 A2d 543 (1986) (Zappala dissenting);
Monosky, 511 A2d 1346 (1986) (Zappala dissenting); Commonwealth v Terfinko, 504 Pa 385,
474 A2d 275 (1984) (Zappala dissenting); Commonwealth v Manley, 503 Pa 482, 469 A2d
1042 (1983) (Zappala dissenting); Commonwealth v Green, 503 Pa 278, 469 A2d 552 (1983)
(Zappala dissenting); Commonwealth v Crowley, 502 Pa 393, 466 A2d 1009 (1983) (Zappala
dissenting).




36. J. Verney, And the Saints Go Marching Out - Rule 1100: Pennsylvania's Imple-
mentation of the Right to a Speedy Trial, 16 Duquesne L Rev 531, 533 (1977-78). For a
general historical perspective of the origin of the right to a speedy trial, see Verney, 16
Duquesne L Rev at 533 (cited within this note); Klopfer v North Carolina, 386 US 213, 223-
26 (1967).
37. US Const, Amend VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." Id.
38. Klopfer, 386 US at 223.
39. Id at 222, 223.
40. 407 US 514 (1972).
41. Barker, 407 US at 523. The Court reasoned, "[w]e find no constitutional basis for
holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or
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opinion, however, noted that the states are "free to prescribe a rea-
sonable period consistent with constitutional standards. '42 The
Court rejected any requirement that a defendant specifically re-
quest a trial before he could assert that his right to a speedy trial
had been violated.4 3 The standard that emerged was a balancing
analysis, which required that each case be resolved upon its spe-
cific facts." Four factors were identified for consideration: "the
length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's asser-
tion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant."' "4 The Court
also specified that the only possible remedy for violation of the
right to a speedy trial was a dismissal of the indictment.46
Concomitant with the federal requirements imposed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Pennsylvania constitution
independently mandates the right to a speedy trial.47 Prior to the
Supreme Court's articulation of its balancing test in Barker, Penn-
sylvania had employed a "two term" or "180-day" rule to deter-
mine whether the right to a speedy trial had been violated.48
Shortly after Barker was decided, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court again had occasion to address the right to a speedy trial in
months." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id at 524. The Court observed that most states had adopted rules (referred to as
the "demand waiver" doctrine) that provided that a defendant waived consideration of his
right to a speedy trial for the time period prior to the point where the defendant actually
demanded a trial. Id. The Court found the presumption of silence as a waiver to be inconsis-
tent with the Court's previous pronouncements on the waiver of constitutional rights. Id.
Accordingly, the Court rejected the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial
absolutely waives his right. Id at 528.
44. Id at 530. The Court summarized its decision: "We, therefore, reject both of the
inflexible approaches - the fixed-time period because it goes further than the Constitution
requires; the demand-waiver rule because it is insensitive to a right which we have deemed
fundamental. The approach we accept is a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed." Id at 529-30.
45. Id at 530.
46. Id at 522.
47. Pa Const, Art 1, § 9. The relevant portion of § 9 states, "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused hath a right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage."
Id.
48. Commonwealth v Hamilton, 449 Pa 297, 297 A2d 127, 130 (1972). The two term
rule provided for discharge from imprisonment of an accused who was not tried by the
second term after his commitment. Such a discharge from incarceration only entitled the
accused to release on bail until the case could be brought to trial. Hamilton, 297 A2d at 130.
See Smith v Patterson, 409 Pa 500, 187 A2d 278 (1963). The court maintained that the
Pennsylvania constitution's mandate for a speedy trial "does not, in itself, warrant anything
beyond a discharge from imprisonment where indictment or trial is delayed." Smith, 187
A2d at 278.
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Commonwealth v Hamilton.4 The court concluded that the "two
term" rule previously utilized in the Commonwealth was inconsis-
tent with the federal rule articulated in Barker.0 The federal bal-
ancing test supplanted the now unconstitutional "two term" rule,
and was applied by the court in the Hamilton case which resulted
in the defendant's release.51
Having rejected the previous Pennsylvania standard, the court
expressed dissatisfaction with the federal balancing test and ob-
served that "experience has demonstrated that under this type of
approach, there has been little success in eliminating criminal
backlogs in populous counties where delays and the evils they cre-
ate are most severe. ' 52 The more efficient approach, the court con-
cluded, was to set a fixed time period within which the accused
must be either brought to trial or released with prejudice."3 Ac-
cordingly, the supremfe court referred the matter to the Criminal
Procedure Rules Committee for study and recommendation.5 4 The
result of the Committee's study was the promulgation of Rule
1100.55
The original fixed time period rule, adopted by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in June of 1973, allowed the Commonwealth
an opportunity to request an extension of the specified period at
any time prior to the expiration of the period.' The rule mandated
49. 449 Pa, 297, 297 A2d 127 (1972). Hamilton, the principal suspect in a Philadelphia
murder, was incarcerated in South Carolina. Pennsylvania authorities, knowing his wherea-
bouts, lodged an arrest detainer against the defendant in 1965 charging him with murder.
No attempt was made to prosecute Hamilton until he initiated proceedings to remove the
detainer in 1971 (a delay of more than six years). Hamilton, 297 A2d at 128.
50. Id at 131. In the court's opinion, the fatal shortcoming of the "two term" rule was
its failure to require the dismissal of the charges with prejudice. Id.
51. Id at 128.
52. Id at 131-32.
53. Id at 132. The court accepted the theory of a fixed period on the supposition that
such a rule eliminates the vagueness inherent in any type of balancing process, and avoids
the judicial burden of deciding each case on an individual basis. Id. The court expressed a
belief that "a mandatory time requirement will act as a stimulant to those entrusted with
the responsibility of managing court calendars." Id at 133.
54. Id.
55. PaRCrP 1100, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1989). The original rule, devised pur-
suant to Hamilton, was adopted June 8, 1973, and was effective prospectively as set forth in
paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the rule. There have been several modifications of the rule
since its adoption, specifically: paragraph (e) amended December 9, 1974, effective immedi-
ately; paragraph (e) re-amended June 28, 1976, effective July 1, 1976; amended October 22,
1981, effective January 1, 1982; amended December 31, 1987, effective immediately; para-
graph (g) amended September 30, 1988, effective immediately. Id, notes and comments fol-
lowing the statute.
56. PaRCrP 1100 adopted June 8, 1973 and in effect with further amendments until
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that such application was to be granted only if trial could not have
been commenced within the prescribed period, despite due dili-
gence on the part of the Commonwealth.5 7 A similar exception sur-
vived the amendment of the rule promulgated on October 22, 1981
(in effect at the time of Commonwealth v Browne)."5
In order to prevail on a petition for an extension of the pre-
scribed time period, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that it has exercised due dili-
gence.59 The courts have interpreted due diligence to require the
exercise of efforts reasonable to the circumstances, 0 not that every
conceivable effort be made.6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
October 22, 1981.
57. Id at § c.
58. PaRCrP 1100 amended October 22, 1981, effective until December 31, 1987, sec-
tions (c)(1) and (c)(3). These sections stated:
(c)(1) At any time prior to the expiration of the period for commencement of trial,
the attorney for the Commonwealth may apply to the court for an order extending
the time for commencement of trial.
(c)(3) Such motion shall set forth facts in support thereof, and shall be granted only
upon findings based upon a record showing that trial cannot be commenced within
the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth.
Id.
A similar due diligence exception has survived to Rule 1100's present form as amended on
December 31, 1987, with a further amendment to subsection (g), which was effective Sep-
tember 30, 1988. PaRCrP 1100, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1989).
The present statute has extended the time period within which the accused must be
brought to trial to 365 days, id at subsection (g), but mandates the release of an incarcer-
ated defendant on nominal bail after 180 days. Id at subsection (e). The section of the
statute dealing with the due diligence exception is now subsection (g), which states:
(g) For defendants on bail after the expiration of three hundred sixty-five (365) days,
at any time before trial, the defendant or his attorney may apply to the court for an
order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been
violated. A copy of such motion shall be served upon the attorney for the Common-
wealth, who shall also have the right to be heard thereon.
If the court, upon hearing, shall determine that the Commonwealth exercised due
diligence and that the circumstances occasioning the postponement were beyond the
control of the Commonwealth, the motion to dismiss shall be denied and the case
shall be listed for trial on a date certain. If, on any successive listing of the case, the
Commonwealth is not prepared to proceed to trial on the date fixed, the court shall
determine whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in attempting to be
prepared to proceed to trial. If, at any time, it is determined that the Commonwealth
did not exercise due diligence, the court shall dismiss the charges and discharge the
defendant.
Id at subsection (g).
59. Commonwealth v Ehredt, 485 Pa 191, 401 A2d 358, 360 (1981).
60. Commonwealth v Williams, 317 Pa Super 456, 464 A2d 411, 417 (1983).
61. Commonwealth v Colon, 317 Pa Super 412, 464 A2d 388, 395 (1983). In Polsky,
426 A2d 610 (1981) (cited in note 27), the supreme court stated that the requirement of due
diligence imposed by Rule 1100 on the Commonwealth's efforts to execute an arrest warrant
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has held that prosecutors must do everything reasonably within
their power to see that a case with possible Rule 1100 problems is
tried on time."2 The standard for due diligence, specifically what is
"reasonable," is malleable, and the court in the past has often al-
lowed the Commonwealth considerable leeway.
The flexibility of the due diligence standard was demonstrated
in Commonwealth v Mayfield.6 3 In Mayfield, the court allowed the
Commonwealth's application for an extension of time for the sole
reason that the trial court's calendar was too congested to bring
the case to trial before the expiration of the mandated time pe-
riod. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania maintained that, in
spite of the fact that a fundamental tenet underlying Rule 1100
was the intent to promote prompt action by courts and prosecu-
tors, the Rule was not intended to be inflexible.6 " Concluding their
opinion, the court indicated that trial courts could grant extensions
under Rule 1100 upon a showing of due diligence by the prosecu-
tion with a certification that the trial was scheduled for the earliest
possible date.6
The rule set forth in Mayfield67 was applied in Commonwealth v
did "not demand perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a reasonable effort."
Polsky, 426 A2d at 613.
62. Commonwealth v Smith, 477 Pa 424, 383 A2d 1280, 1282 (1978). The court held
that the Commonwealth did not show due diligence when it reassigned the prosecutor han-
dling the case to another trial and did not assign another prosecutor to handle the instant
case before the expiration of the prescribed period. The court specifically noted that there
may be instances where the Commonwealth has more cases with Rule 1100 problems than
they have available prosecutors, but that was not the case here. Smith, 383 A2d at 1282.
63. 469 Pa 214, 364 A2d 1345 (1976). The prosecution was prepared to try the accused
on drunken driving charges three months before the 180 day time period was to expire. Due
to a backlog of cases, the earliest available trial date was ten days after the period expired.
Mayfield, 364 A2d at 1349.
64. Id at 1346.
65. Id at 1348. Conceding that, despite due diligence, it may sometimes be possible
that a trial cannot be commenced within the required time frame, the court reasoned that
the policies that prompted the promulgation of Rule 1100 would not be served by disallow-
ing a reasonable extension which specified when the trial would be held. Id.
66. Id at 1349.
67. The rule announced was:
Henceforth, the trial court may grant an extension under rule 1100(c) only upon a
record showing (1) the "due diligence" of the prosecutor, and (2) certification that
trial is scheduled for the earliest possible date consistent with the court's business;
provided that if the delay is due to the court's inability to try the defendant within
the prescribed period, the record must also show the causes of the court delay and
the reasons why the delay cannot be avoid.
Id at 1349-50.
This two prong requirement was incorporated into Rule 1100 as amended October 22,
1981, effective January 1, 1982. PaRCrP 1100(c)(3), which was in effect at all times perti-
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Lamb.e8 The Lamb court held that the Commonwealth had satis-
fied the rule by filing its petition for extension within the pre-
scribed period, stipulating with opposing counsel that other cases
on the docket had earlier run dates,"9 and representing to the court
that the Commonwealth was prepared to go to trial before the ex-
piration of the period but was unable to do so because of the un-
availability of any criminal trial terms prior to the run date. 70
The supreme court refined the Mayfield test in Commonwealth
v Crowley.7 In Crowley, the court held that Mayfield "does not
require the Commonwealth to exhaust the possibility of rearrang-
ing overcrowded court dockets to accommodate the Rule 1100 run
dates regardless of that rearrangement's effect on other matters. 72
This view was fortified in Commonwealth v Terfinko,7 3 where the
court, finding in favor of the Commonwealth, said it would refuse
nent to this case. Browne, 584 A2d at 903. The rule was later amended effective December
31, 1987, with a further amendment to subsection (g) effective September 30, 1988. PaRCrP
1100, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1989), notes and comments following the statute.
68. 309 Pa Super 415, 455 A2d 678 (1983). In Lamb the defendant, accused of robbery,
was not brought to trial within the period mandated by Rule 1100 because no trial dates
within the prescribed period were available. Lamb, 455 A2d at 681. The trial court granted
an extension of time to commence trial, accepting the prosecution's assertion that the Com-
monwealth was fully prepared to go to trial and had thereby fulfilled Rule 1100's due dili-
gence requirement. Id.
69. The term "run date" was used by the court to identify the latest date that trial
could begin and still be within the time period specified by Rule 1100. Id.
70. Id at 683. The superior court relied in part on Lamb in reaching its decision in
favor of the Commonwealth in Commonwealth v Browne, 385 Pa Super 646, 555 A2d 242
(1988). In its memorandum opinion, the court said that the lack of stipulation in Browne
was not fatal to its analogy with Lamb. The court reasoned that the Commonwealth's timely
filing of a Petition for Extension of Time and the acknowledgement by all concerned that
the assignment of the September 30th arraignment date was the reason for the late trial
date were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Mayfield. Commonwealth v Browne, No
03516, slip op at 4 (Pa Super 1987).
71. 502 Pa 393, 466 A2d 1009 (1983). In Crowley, the defendant's case was not reached
on the day it was scheduled for trial. The assignment clerk then placed the case at the
bottom of the list of pending cases. The pending cases were taken in chronological order. By
the time Crowley's case was heard, the 180 day limit imposed by Rule 1100 had expired.
Crowley, 466 A2d at 1011.
72. Id at 1010. The superior court had ruled against the Commonwealth based upon a
belief that Mayfield allowed for "judicial delay" only when the delay was unavoidable. Id at
1011.
The supreme court reversed the superior court, conceding that while it may be possible in
some sense to arrange court calendars to ensure that every criminal defendant is tried
within the prescribed time limit, such a scheduling system would be unrealistic. Id at 1013.
73. 504 Pa 385, 474 A2d 275 (1984). In Terfinko, the defendant's case was not reached
on its original trial date, nor on the following day (within the prescribed time period). Con-
sequently, the case was rescheduled for the next month, which exceeded the specified pe-
riod. Terfinko, 474 A2d at 277.
Recent Decisions
to apply a "stopwatch approach to the definition of 'due
diligence.' -74
In Commonwealth v Monosky,75 a delay occasioned by a district
magistrate was addressed .7  The district attorney was not made
aware of the charges against the defendant until 165 days after the
complaint was filed. 7 The only reason that was advanced for the
delay was that the district magistrate had simply misplaced the
paperwork.78 The supreme court reversed the superior court and
reinstated judgement against the defendant, holding that a judicial
delay occurring before the district attorney becomes aware of the
case may justify (and in this case did justify) the granting of an
application for extension.79 Furthermore, the court stated that it
disapproved of the dictum in Mayfield to the extent that it im-
plied that the Commonwealth was to be held accountable for inad-
vertent judicial delays occasioned by the minor judiciary.8 0 The
court specifically underscored the fact that they were not reaching
the question of whether an unexplained judicial delay, occurring
after the district attorney had been made aware of the charges
against an accused, could support an extension.'
The status of Rule 1100 prior to the supreme court's decision in
Browne was that of a rule riddled with exceptions. It is clear that
the Commonwealth was not held responsible for delays occasioned
by other agencies within the criminal justice system when the
party ultimately responsible for satisfying the mandate of the Rule
was unaware of the delay. It is equally clear that the Rule's re-
quirement of due diligence had been interpreted to allow the vast
majority of delays to be tolerated, so long as the Commonwealth
had made a timely petition for an extension of time. The signifi-
cance of Browne, therefore, is the meaning the supreme court has
74. Id at 279. The court, quoting Crowley, 466 A2d at 1014, reiterated:
Rule 1100 should not be construed to require the Common Pleas Courts with back-
logged criminal dockets to devote all their administrative and judicial resources to
guarantee that every defendant is tried within the period prescribed by the Rule.
It should be sufficient for the court to establish that it has devoted a reasonable
amount of its resources to the criminal docket and that it scheduled the criminal trial
at the earliest possible date consistent with the court's business.
Terfinko, 474 A2d at 279.
75. 511 Pa 148, 511 A2d 1346 (1986).
76. Monosky, 511 A2d at 1347.
77. Id.
78. Id.





infused into the due diligence requirement; that is, what is "rea-
sonable." In its opinion, the court specifically set out the reason
they chose to review Browne:
We granted allocatur based on a continuous review of our appellate docket,
because, blatantly put, we have become concerned that the Superior Court
is more and more inclined to accept any and every excuse for failure to
bring a criminal case to trial within the period prescribed by Rule 1100, and
that this case presented the opportunity to prevent further emasculation of
Rule 1100.82
The stern tone of this portion of the opinion is unmistakable. A
narrow reading of the Browne opinion would reveal that Rule
1100's due diligence component requires the Commonwealth to
"employ a simple record keeping system" to monitor run dates in
criminal cases to ensure compliance with the Rule's prescribed
time period.83 The real significance of the opinion, however, is that
the supreme court has put the Commonwealth on notice that Rule
1100 issues will now be reviewed in a more critical light. As Justice
Zappala concluded in his concurring opinion:
The purpose of the rule cannot be advanced if we continue to make excuses
for the failure to enforce it. It is for these reasons that I strongly concur in
the great stride made by the majority today in recognizing this fact.
84
Justice Zappala's concurrence reflected his view that the decision
in Browne portends a strong reversal of the court's previous am-
bivalence toward enforcement of Rule 1100.
8 5
There is little doubt that the court has strengthened its commit-
ment to Rule 1100. It remains to be seen, however, how deeply that
commitment runs. The true test of Rule 1100's apparent resurrec-
tion will be whether or not the court will vigorously enforce the
statute when the crimes at issue are of a more grave nature than
the drunk driving violation at issue in Browne.
The fact that the supreme court's renewed dedication to Rule
1100 was expressed in a relatively minor criminal 6 case should not
be misinterpreted. It is only logical to choose a relatively minor
case as the forum to put the Commonwealth on notice that Rule
1100 violations will be examined with closer scrutiny. Given the
82. Browne, 584 A2d at 905.
83. Id at 906.
84. Id.
85. Id. See note 32 and accompanying text.
86. The crime of driving under the influence of alcohol is characterized as a relatively
minor crime only to distinguish it from more heinous crimes where the interests of the Com-
monwealth in successfully prosecuting the case are arguably greater.
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clarity with which the court expressed its intention to thwart fur-
ther emasculation of the Rule,87 'the Commonwealth should not ex-
pect the court to regress on this issue, regardless of the severity of
the crime in question.
David Gilmartin
87. Browne, 584 A2d at 905. See note 82 and accompanying text.

